Hating Starmer Has Become an Export to the American Slop Market

Widespread anger at Keir Starmer’s government remains intense, with much of it fastened on the Prime Minister’s manner or short-term polling rather than measurable outcomes. This focus is cheap because it requires little engagement with evidence and ephemeral because it treats the current office-holder as the root cause rather than the latest manager of entrenched constraints. When the record is examined directly against the fourteen years of Conservative rule that came before, Starmer’s administration has produced concrete shifts on net migration, the regulation of pornography and platform harms, independence in foreign policy, and even basic infrastructure maintenance. These changes have taken place inside a British establishment whose institutional habits, legal frameworks and cultural assumptions continue to limit room for manoeuvre. Replacement by any other figure—whether from Labour’s left (Andy Burnham), Reform (Nigel Farage) or elsewhere—would encounter substantially the same architecture.

Net migration provides the clearest metric. It peaked at 944,000 in the year to March 2023. By the year ending December 2025 it had fallen to 171,000—an 82 per cent reduction from the high and a near-halving from 331,000 the previous year. This is the lowest level since 2012 outside the pandemic period. Small boat crossings, the principal visible channel of irregular entry, declined 13 per cent in the latest comparable period to the lowest figures in three years. Critics on the right have sought to discount the achievement by pointing to British emigration, which stood at 246,000 in the most recent year. Net figures already subtract those departures. The controllable element for policy is inflows; elevated native emigration frequently follows the housing, wage and identity pressures generated by earlier high inflows. Reducing the net total still marks a policy reversal from the trajectory of the previous decade and a half.

Even on the mundane but highly visible issue of road maintenance, the government has directed significant additional resources. Funding increases for 2025/26 are projected to enable the repair of the equivalent of over 7 million extra potholes, exceeding the manifesto commitment of one million additional per year and addressing a persistent source of public irritation and vehicle damage that previous administrations allowed to fester through chronic underfunding. Yes, reader, he’s fixing the potholes. Anecdotally, I’ve had reports from all around the country that local potholes have been fixed in the past year.

On pornography and social media, enforcement of age verification from July 2025 produced immediate effects. Major platforms recorded UK traffic drops as large as 77 per cent, with Ofcom data showing overall visits to leading pornography services settling at materially lower levels. VPN usage spiked initially—more than doubling at peak—before declining to around 900,000 daily users, well below prior direct consumption volumes This is around 1.29% using VPNs every day. To put it in context, before Starmer’s de facto ban, Ofcom estimated that around 14 million people in the UK regularly watch online pornography, around 20%. While we cannot say for sure it is a reduction from 20% to 1.29%, we can be sure the reduction is substantial. This should have been widely celebrated by conservatives, but instead they spent their time writing trash articles about Bonnie Blue. Platforms are barred from encouraging or facilitating circumvention, and the net reduction in easy access has been substantial.

Right-leaning commentary has often framed such measures as free-speech infringements, preferring to focus on social media rather than porn. They have consciously aligned themselves with figures such as Elon Musk. This overlooks how dominant social media platforms function as instruments of narrative power, capable of shaping domestic discourse in ways that serve external interests. British alternative media outlets and content creators have frequently amplified stories of imminent civil war and terminal decline, content that plays particularly well to American audiences. Many such British creators have built substantial US followings—often their primary revenue source through Super Chats, Patreon subscriptions, merchandise, and algorithmic ad revenue from a vast, monetisable market hungry for confirmation of European decline. This creates a cynical incentive structure: domestic UK analysis is subordinated to transatlantic grift, with sensational narratives of ‘no-go zones,’ grooming epidemics, two-tier policing and societal collapse optimised for engagement rather than proportion. The effect is to furnish MAGA perspectives with a comforting contrast that spares them sustained reckoning with domestic American conditions—faster erosion of the historic white majority share, entrenched patterns of urban violence, and political fractures that produced debacles such as January 6—while British audiences receive a distorted mirror that flatters despair over sober assessment. We end up with febrile domestic right-wingers slurping up hyperreal slop designed chiefly to be sold into existing narratives for the US market, a kind of double Americanisation.

Foreign policy supplies another departure for Starmer. No prime minister since Harold Wilson, who resisted American pressure to commit forces to Vietnam, has asserted comparable independence on a major conflict. Starmer stated plainly that the Iran confrontation ‘is not our war’ and declined military entanglement, prioritising diplomacy over alliance reflex. This stands against the pattern since Wilson: Blair’s Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan commitments, Cameron’s Libya intervention, and Johnson’s Churchillian belligerence towards Russia. Self-described nationalists showed little interest in defending this assertion of sovereignty, their priorities often aligning instead with external actors seeking to weaken the current government. At worst this manifested in abject fealty to the Trump administration including calls for the American President to bomb London—just another of many frankly embarrassing episodes on the British right in the past several years.

What is ironic about all of this is that British outcomes can be set against comparable American metrics, where nationalists claim primary concern for the native white population. In England and Wales the 2021 census recorded White British at 74.4 per cent of the population (with overall White categories at 81.7 per cent). US estimates place non-Hispanic Whites at approximately 56.3 per cent in recent data. Britain therefore retains a substantially larger share of its historic native European-descended population. On lethal violence the gap is starker: the UK homicide rate stood at 8.6 per million in the latest year, against roughly 58 per million in the United States—making US rates approximately 570 per cent higher. Broader violent crime follows the same pattern, with US figures substantially elevated, especially in categories involving firearms and interpersonal lethality. Obesity prevalence reaches 42.4 per cent in the US compared with 27.8 per cent in the UK—over 50 per cent higher. Life expectancy in the UK remains higher, at around 81.3–81.8 years versus approximately 79 years in the United States. These are not trivial differences; they reflect measurable advantages in physical safety, population health and the slower pace of demographic replacement of the native stock.

The prevailing picture of Britain as a uniquely collapsing society therefore requires qualification. Yes, there are real problems—grooming scandals, periodic disorder, pressures on housing and services—but they sit alongside objective strengths that compare favourably with the United States on the very metrics nationalists purport to prioritise. Narratives that portray Britain as a basket case while downplaying parallel or much more acute American difficulties often serve a transatlantic audience function rather than domestic analysis. Americans love to cope, while Brits love to moan so it’s a near perfect export product.

None of this implies that Starmer has transformed the underlying regime. The British establishment—civil service, judiciary, media institutions, NGOs and associated networks—continues to operate with all of their usual assumptions and pathologies. Starmer has (in his actions more than his words) pushed against some of these, yet remains constrained by them. The same constraints would shape any successor. The anger directed at the present Prime Minister substitutes personality for structure. It flatters the critic with moral clarity (and with clicks) while evading the harder question of how institutional power is organised and whether a coherent project exists to alter its distribution. On immigration control, restriction of pornography access, social media regulation, road maintenance and foreign-policy independence, the record shows some degree of movement by the British ruling class, but change is slow. Serious assessment is unpopular. You must constantly focus on the durable features of the regime, which is hard, rather than cycling through the satisfactions of personal denunciation, which is easy. People prefer easy, thus politics will continue to rotate faces while most of the deeper patterns remain intact and unexamined.